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Abstract
A compositional semantics for nondeterministic dataﬂow processes is described using spans of event struc-
tures; such a span describes a computation between datatypes, themselves represented by event structures,
as itself an event structure. The spans of event structures represent certain profunctors (a generalisation of
relations) used previously in a compositional semantics of nondeterministic dataﬂow and in the semantics of
higher-order processes. Deterministic spans of event structures are shown to correspond to stable continuous
functions and their semantics of dataﬂow to reduce to the usual least ﬁxed-point semantics of Kahn.
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1 Introduction
A dataﬂow process is built as a network of more basic processes connected by
channels. In particular processes may be connected to allow feedback loops from
output to input.
In [6], Kahn demonstrated that a denotational semantics could be given to a
dataﬂow network of deterministic processes as a least ﬁxed point solution of a set
of equations describing the components.
Brock and Ackerman showed in [2] that giving a semantics to nondeterministic
dataﬂow processes was far from easy. In particular, input-output relations between
sequences of values on input and output channels carry too little information about
the behaviour of networks to support a compositional semantics. The following
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example is essentially that presented in [11]. Let A1 be the nondeterministic process
that either outputs a token and stops, or outputs a token, waits for a token on input
and then outputs another token. Let A2 be the process that either outputs a token
and stops, or waits for a token on input and then outputs two tokens. The input-
output relations between strings of tokens of both A1 and A2 are the same:
{(ε, t), (t, t), (t, tt)} ,
where ε represents the empty string of tokens and the presence of a token is rep-
resented by the symbol t. Let F be the process that copies every input to two
outputs through which the output of the process Ai is fed back to the input chan-
nel. Observe that the process A1 placed in this context produces a process which
can output two tokens whereas the process A2 results in a process that can only
output a single token.






FAiC[Ai] =
This conﬁrms that there is no denotational semantics of nondeterministic dataﬂow
in terms of traditional input-output relations. For similar reasons traditional uses
of powerdomains also fall short.
Although traditional relations are insuﬃcient, it was however shown in [4,5] that
a compositional form of relational semantics is possible, but at the cost of moving
to generalised relations called profunctors. Here we provide a representation of the
stable port profunctors used in [4,5] as spans of event structures. The intention is to
ﬁt nondeterministic dataﬂow within a versatile theory of processes and types based
on a general theory of spans of event structures [14,12].
In more recent years feedback of the kind found in dataﬂow has reappeared
in a variety of new contexts, which are condensed in a more abstract and general
formulation of the properties a feedback operation, called trace, should satisfy. Let
C be a category with a symmetric monoidal structure, ⊗. A trace operation for C
is deﬁned to be a family of operations, TrCA,B : C(A⊗ C, B ⊗ C)→ C(A, B). The
intuition behind this operation is illustrated in the following diagram:
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A trace operation must obey a number of axioms to ensure it behaves correctly. The
reader is referred to [4,5], which this paper supplements, for the detailed axioms and
fuller set of references to this rich area.
2 Spans of Event Structures
Event structures model a process as a set of event occurrences with relations to ex-
press how events causally depend on others, or exclude other events from occurring.
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Deﬁnition 2.1 An event structure is a tuple, (E, ≤, #), where:
• E is a set of events;
• ≤ is a partial order on E. Deﬁne [e] to be {e′ | e′ ≤ e}. It must be the case that
the set [e] is ﬁnite for all e ∈ E;
• # is a binary, irreﬂexive, symmetric relation such that e1#e2 and e2 ≤ e3 implies
that e1#e3.
A conﬁguration of an event structure is a downwards closed subset of events in
which no two events are in conﬂict. Deﬁne C(E) to be the set of conﬁgurations of
E. 
The set of conﬁgurations of an event structure when ordered by inclusion form
a prime algebraic domain [8]; the complete primes have the form [e] for an event e.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A set of conﬁgurations X of an event structure E is compatible,
written X↑, iﬀ there is a conﬁguration y such that ∀x ∈ X. x ⊆ y; then
⋃
X is
itself a conﬁguration. In the case where X = {w, z} we usually write w ↑ z instead
of X↑. 
Since their introduction in [8] it has been recognised that event structures can
represent both processes and domains. At the time, in [8], this was remarked on
as creating a ‘curious mismatch’; in traditional denotational semantics, a process
denotes only an element of a domain. The ambiguous double role of event structures
can be resolved by working with spans of event structures. A span
E
in
 
 out



A B
represents a process computing from a type, represented by event structure A,
to the type B, another event structure, as again itself an event structure E. The
morphisms in and out specify how the event structure E inspects input and delivers
output. There are many possible variations on spans as the morphisms in and out
can have diﬀerent natures. A systematic way to explore the range of possibilities
via monads and distributive laws was suggested in [14] and is the subject of ongoing
research [12]. For the purposes of this paper however we can restrict to very speciﬁc
spans in which in is a ‘demand’ morphism and out is ‘rigid.’ Such spans ﬁrst arose
unexpectedly as representations of the profunctors used in a denotational semantics
of higher-order processes [9].
A rigid morphism, f : E1 → E2, between event structures E1 and E2 consists
of a function between the respective sets of events such that
• [f(e)] = f [e], for all events e in E1, and
• if f(e) = f(e′) or f(e)#f(e′), then e = e′ or e#e′, for all e and e′ in E1.
Rigid morphisms compose as functions. In proofs we will use an alternative charac-
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terisation of rigid morphisms, and properties based on their eﬀect on conﬁgurations.
Proposition 2.3 Let E1 and E2 be event structures. A function f from the set of
events E1 to the set of events E2 is a rigid morphism f : E1 → E2 iﬀ it
• preserves causal dependency,
∀e, e′ ∈ E1. e ≤ e
′ ⇒ f(e) ≤ f(e′) , and
• preserves conﬁgurations,
∀x ∈ C(E1). fx ∈ C(E2) & ∀e, e
′ ∈ x. f(e) = f(e′) ⇒ e = e′ .
A rigid morphism f : E1 → E2 determines a stable function on conﬁgurations [1]:
∀x, y ∈ C(E1). x ↑ y ⇒ f(x ∩ y) = (f x) ∩ (f y) .
A demand morphism d : E1 → E2 is a function from the set of events E1 to the
ﬁnite conﬁgurations of E2. It must obey the following conditions:
• e ≤ e′ implies d(e) ⊆ d(e′), for all events e, e′ ∈ E1;
• d(e) ↑ d(e′) implies e#e′, for all events e, e′ ∈ E1.
A demand morphism can be extended to act on conﬁgurations as well as events.
Let d : E1 → E2 be a demand morphism between E1 and E2. We can extend this
to a function d† : C(E1)→ C(E2) by
d†(x)
def
=
⋃
e∈x
d(e)
for x ∈ C(E1). The fact that d
†(x) is a conﬁguration follows directly from x being
a conﬁguration and that d(e1) ↑ d(e2) implies that e1#e2. Clearly, if x is a ﬁnite
conﬁguration, then so is d†(x), and the extension d† sends ﬁnite conﬁgurations
to ﬁnite conﬁgurations. The composition of two demand morphisms d2 ◦ d1 is
achieved by the composition of functions d†2 ◦ d1.
For this paper, we restrict attention to spans of a special kind:
Deﬁnition 2.4 A span of event structures comprises A
d
← E
out
→ B where E, A and
B are event structures, d is a demand morphism and out is a rigid morphism.
(Where there is no confusion, we refer to a span by its vertex, i.e., A
d
← E
out
→ B
will be referred to as E.) 
We can compose spans sequentially. Given two spans A
d1← E1
out1→ B and
B
d2← E2
out2→ C, their composition is the span A
d
← E3
out
→ C where E3 comprises
the event structure with
• Events {(x, e) ∈ C(E1)× E2 | out1x = d2(e)};
• Causal dependency (x, e) ≤ (x′ e′) iﬀ x ⊆ x′ and e ≤ e′;
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• Conﬂict (x, e)#(x′, e′) iﬀ x ↑ x′ or e#e′.
The demand and output morphisms of the composition d and out are given by
d(x, e)
def
= d†1(x) and out(x, e)
def
= out2(e) .
Because rigid morphisms can be identiﬁed with (certain kinds of) demand mor-
phisms, this construction can be viewed as a pullback construction in the category
of event structures with demand morphisms. (The spans here form a bicategory in
the usual manner of spans [7].)
There is also a parallel composition of spans (which forms the symmetric
monoidal structure, ⊗, referred to in Section 1).
Deﬁnition 2.5 Given two event structures, (E1, ≤1, #1) and (E2, ≤2, #2), their
parallel composition (E1, ≤1, #1)⊗ (E2, ≤2, #2) is the event structure with:
• Events E1 unionmulti E2, the disjoint union of events, ({1} × E1) ∪ ({2} × E2),
• Causal dependency (i, e1) ≤ (j, e2) iﬀ i = j and e1 ≤i e2, and
• Conﬂict (i, e1)#(j, e2) iﬀ i = j and e1#ie2.

Once the event structures are made disjoint their parallel composition is given
by the union of their events and relations of causality and conﬂict.
The parallel composition of A
d1← E1
out1→ B and C
d2← E2
out2→ D is
E1 ⊗ E2
d1⊗d2
 




out1⊗out2






A⊗ C B ⊗D
where (d1⊗d2)(i, e)
def
= {i}×di(e) and (out1⊗out2)(i, e)
def
= (i, outi(e)) for i = 1, 2.
From these constructions, it is possible to give a semantics to nondeterministic
dataﬂow.
3 Stable Families
It is sometimes diﬃcult to deﬁne constructions on event structures directly and it
is often simpler to ﬁrst deﬁne them in terms of stable families, from which an event
structure can then be obtained from the prime conﬁgurations. Stable families will
be used to deﬁne the trace construction.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A stable family, F , is a set of sets with the following properties.
• Coherence ∀X ⊆ F . (∀x, y ∈ X. x ↑ y) ⇒
⋃
X ∈ F .
• Stability X ↑ ⇒
⋂
X ∈ F for all non-empty X ⊆ F .
• Coincidence-freeness
∀x ∈ F , e1, e2 ∈ x. e1 = e2 ⇒
∃y ∈ F . y ⊆ x & ((e1 ∈ y) & (e2 ∈ y)) or ((e2 ∈ y) & (e1 ∈ y)).
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• Finiteness ∀x ∈ F , e ∈ x∃y ∈ F . y ⊆ x & e ∈ y & |y| < ∞.

It can be deduced that a stable family, ordered by inclusion, forms a prime
algebraic domain [8,13]. If x is a member of a stable family F and e ∈ x let
[e]x
def
=
⋂
{y ∈ F|e ∈ y & y ⊆ x}.
Then [e]x ∈ F and is called a prime conﬁguration of F . (It is a complete prime of
(F , ⊆) in the sense of [8].) Because of coincidence-freeness, taking max([e]x)
def
= e
is well-deﬁned.
4 Trace for Event Structures
This section is devoted to deﬁning a trace operation TrCA,B which takes a span from
A⊗ C to B ⊗ C to a span from A to B. Consider a span
E
d
 

 out



A⊗ C B ⊗ C .
We ﬁrst build a stable family out of those conﬁgurations of E which are secure.
Roughly a conﬁguration x is secure if the demand of each event e ∈ x is either met
by the input in A, or by previous output to C, which we imagine is fed back as
input. This idea is formalised below.
In deﬁning the trace it is convenient to assume that both pairs of sets A, C, and
B, C are disjoint, so that we can treat the parallel compositions A⊗C and B ⊗C
as given by union. We can now, for example, write y ∩ C for the ‘projection’ of a
conﬁguration y ∈ C(A⊗ C) to its component in the event structure C.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let x be a conﬁguration of E. A securing sequence in x consists of
a sequence of events e1, · · · , en in x such that
{e1, · · · , ei} ∈ C(E) & d(ei) ∩ C ⊆ out{e1, · · · , ei−1}
for all i ≤ n. An event e is secured in x iﬀ there is a securing sequence e1, · · · , en in
x with en = e. Finally, the conﬁguration x is secure if each of its events is secured
in x. 
The subset of C(E), consisting of all the secure conﬁgurations will be shown to
be a stable family, from which we then obtain an event structure. Our proofs will
make use of a relation ≺x expressing the extra causal dependency on a conﬁguration
x of E which is introduced through feedback.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let x be a conﬁguration of E. For all events e1 and e2 in x, deﬁne
e1 →x e2 iﬀ out(e1) ∈ d(e2) ∩ C, and
e1 ≺x e2 iﬀ e1 < e2 or e1 →x e2.
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We deﬁne {e}x to be the set {e
′ | e′ ≺x
 e} for all e ∈ x. (Note that because {e}x
must be a downwards closed subset of x with respect to causal dependency it is
necessarily a conﬁguration.) 
Lemma 4.3 An event e is secured in conﬁguration x iﬀ
(i) ≺x is well-founded on {e}x, and
(ii) (d†({e}x)) ∩ C ⊆ out x.
Proof. if : Assume (i) and (ii). To prove that event e is secured in x, we require a
securing sequence for e. First note that the set {e}x is ﬁnite as ≺x is well-founded
and the set of ≺x-predecessors of an event is also ﬁnite. Thus tentatively we may
take the securing sequence to be a choice of order {e1, · · · , en} of the set {e}x which
respects ≺x, i.e., for 0 < i, j ≤ n,
(ei ≺x ej ⇒ i < j) and en = e .
We now check that the chosen sequence is indeed securing. Observe that the
set {e1, · · · , ei}, with i ≤ n, is a conﬁguration of E because it is a downwards
closed subset of x—this follows immediately from the deﬁnition of ≺x. It re-
mains to conﬁrm that d(ei) ∩ C ⊆ out{e1, · · · , ei−1}, for all i ≤ n. Consider
an event c ∈ d(ei) ∩ C for some i ≤ n. As d
†({e}x) ∩ C ⊆ out x, we have
that c = out(e′) for some e′ ∈ x. By deﬁnition, e′ →x ei, so e
′ ≺x ei. Thus
e′ ∈ {e}x and, as the sequence respects ≺x, we see that e
′ = ej for some j < i.
This conﬁrms that c ∈ out{e1, · · · , ei−1}. Hence {e1, · · · , en} is a securing sequence.
only if : Assume that e1, · · · , en = e is a securing sequence in x.
We ﬁrst show that for i ≤ n
e′ ≺x ei ⇒ e
′ ∈ {e1, · · · , ei−1}(†)
and therefore that e′ = ej for some j < i.
By deﬁnition if e′ ≺x ei then either e
′ < ei or e
′ →x ei. As {e1, · · · , ei}
is a conﬁguration and therefore downwards closed with respect to <, if e′ < ei
then e′ ∈ {e1, · · · , ei−1}. If e
′ →x ei then out(e
′) ∈ d(ei) ∩ C. But d(ei) ∩ C ⊆
out{e1, · · · , ei−1} by the property of a securing sequence. So out(e
′) = out(ej)
where ej ∈ {e1, · · · , ei−1}. As both e
′, ej ∈ x and out is a rigid morphism e
′ = ej so
e′ ∈ {e1, · · · , ei−1}.
Now we can show (i) and (ii).
(i) By (†) a ≺x-descending chain in {e}x induces a strictly descending chain of ﬁnite
sets under inclusion—which is certainly well-founded. Hence ≺x is well-founded on
{e}x.
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(ii) It follows from (†) that {e}x ⊆ {e1, · · · , en}, so d
†({e}x) ⊆ d
†({e1, · · · , en}).
Thus
(d†({e}x)) ∩ C ⊆ (d
†({e1, · · · , en}) ∩C
⊆ (
⋃
i≤n
d(ei)) ∩ C
⊆
⋃
i≤n
(d(ei) ∩ C)
⊆
⋃
i≤n
out{e1, · · · , ei−1} as e1,. . . ,en is a securing sequence,
⊆ out x .

Corollary 4.4 A conﬁguration x is secure iﬀ
(i) ≺x is well-founded on x, and
(ii) d†(x) ∩ C ⊆ out x.
Proof. if: Assume that a conﬁguration x satisﬁes (i) and (ii) above. Let e ∈ x.
Then certainly ≺x is well-founded on {e}x and (d
†({e}x)) ∩C ⊆ d
†(x)∩C ⊆ out x.
Thus e is secured in x by Lemma 4.3. But e was an arbitrary event in x. Hence x
is secure.
only if: Assume the conﬁguration x is secure. By Lemma 4.3, ≺x is well-founded
on x, i.e. (i) . To show (ii):
d†(x) ∩C = (
⋂
e∈x
d†({e}x)) ∩ C
=
⋂
e∈x
(d†({e}x) ∩ C) ⊆ out x , by Lemma 4.3.

In proving that the family of secure conﬁgurations forms a stable family, we will
make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose x and y are secure conﬁgurations of E with x ↑ y. Let e ∈
x ∩ y. Then,
(i) e′ ≺x e iﬀ e
′ ≺y e, for all events e
′, and
(ii) {e}x = {e}y.
If x is a secure conﬁguration and e ∈ x, then {e}x is the least secure sub-
conﬁguration of x containing e.
Proof. (i) Assume e ∈ x ∩ y where x ↑ y. Suppose e′ ≺x e. Then either e
′ < e or
e′ →x e. In the former case, e ∈ y and e
′ ≺y e. In the latter case, out(e
′) ∈ d(e)∩C
with e′ ∈ x. As y is secure,
d(e) ∩ C ⊆ (d†(y)) ∩ C ⊆ out y .
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Thus out(e′) = out(e′′) with e′ ∈ x and some e′′ ∈ y. But x ↑ y and out is a rigid
morphism, so e′ = e′′ making e′ ∈ y. It follows that e′ →y e, and e
′ ≺y e. In either
case, e′ ≺x e implies e
′ ≺y e. The same argument proves the converse implication,
establishing (i).
(ii) Obvious from (i).
Assume e ∈ x where x is a secure conﬁguration. From Corollary 4.4, to establish
that {e}x is secure it suﬃces to check (i) that ≺{e}x is well-founded on {e}x and (ii)
that (d†({e}x))∩C ⊆ out {e}x. Now (i) follows directly because ≺x, which includes
≺{e}x , is well-founded on {e}x by Lemma 4.3. We now concentrate on showing
(ii). By Lemma 4.3, as x is secure, we have that (d†({e}x)) ∩ C ⊆ out x. Thus
any event of (d†({e}x)) ∩ C takes the form out(e
′) for some e′ ∈ x. But supposing
out(e′) ∈ (d†({e}x)) ∩ C, then out(e
′) ∈ (d(e′′)) ∩ C, i.e. e′ →x e
′′, for some
e′′ ∈ {e}x. Consequently, e
′ ∈ {e}x. Hence (d
†({e}x)) ∩ C ⊆ out {e}x.
Suppose e ∈ y ⊆ x where y is a secure conﬁguration. Then certainly x ↑ y, so
{e}x = {e}y ⊆ y. Thus, {e}x is the least secure sub-conﬁguration of x containing
e. 
Theorem 4.6 The family consisting of all secure conﬁgurations of E is a stable
family. For any e ∈ x, a secure conﬁguration, [e]x = {e}x.
Proof. Let S = {x ∈ C(E) | x is secure}. We show S is a stable family.
Coherence: ∀X ⊆ S. (∀x, y ∈ X. x ↑ y) ⇒
⋃
X ∈ S.
Assume X is a pairwise compatible subset of S. It is clear that
⋃
X is a conﬁg-
uration of E. If e ∈
⋃
X then e ∈ x for some x in X. As e is secured in x and
x ⊆
⋃
X , there is a securing sequence for e in
⋃
X.
Stability : ∀X ⊆ S. X ↑ ⇒
⋂
X ∈ S.
Suppose X ⊆ S and X ↑. Then, ∀x ∈ X. x ⊆ y for some secure conﬁguration y.
Consider the set
Y
def
= {{e}y | e ∈
⋂
X } .
It consists of secure conﬁgurations which are certainly pairwise compatible, with
upper bound y. By coherence,
⋃
Y is a secure conﬁguration. Clearly,
⋂
X ⊆
⋃
Y
as each e ∈
⋂
X is a member of {e}y . For any e ∈
⋂
X and x ∈ X, then
{e}y = {e}x ⊆ x, by Lemma 4.5. So we also have the reverse inclusion
⋃
Y ⊆
⋂
X
ensuring the equality
⋂
X =
⋃
Y , and that
⋂
X is a secure conﬁguration.
Finiteness: ∀x ∈ S∀e ∈ x∃y ∈ S. y ⊆ x & e ∈ y & |y| < ∞.
If x is secure then each event e in x must have a securing sequence. This determines
a ﬁnite secure conﬁguration in S which contains e.
Coincidence-freeness: ∀x ∈ S, e1, e2 ∈ x. e1 = e2 ⇒
∃y ∈ S. y ⊆ x & ((e1 ∈ y) & (e2 ∈ y)) or ((e2 ∈ y) and (e1 ∈ y)).
L. Saunders-Evans, G. Winskel / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 175 (2007) 109–129 117
Assume e1, e2 ∈ x ∈ S and e1 = e2. Consider the secure conﬁgurations {e1}x and
{e2}x. If e2 is a member of {e1}x then e2 ≺
+
x e1. As x is secure, it cannot be the
case that e1 ≺
+
x e2—otherwise we would contradict the well-foundedness of ≺x.
Therefore e1 ∈ {e2}x if e2 ∈ {e1}x and vice versa.
Finally, let e ∈ x, a secure conﬁguration. Both [e]x (by deﬁnition) and {e}x (by
Lemma 4.5) are the smallest secure sub-conﬁgurations of x which contain e, and
hence equal. 
We can now deﬁne the trace operation.
Deﬁnition 4.7 Deﬁne Tr(A⊗ C
d
← E
out
→ B ⊗ C) to be A
d′
← P
out′
→ B where P is
the event structure comprising
• Events, the prime conﬁgurations p of S for which out(max(p)) ∈ B, with
• Causal dependency, p1 ≤ p2 iﬀ p1 ⊆ p2, and
• Conﬂict, p1#p2 iﬀ p1 ↑ p2 in S,
and where, for p ∈ P , we deﬁne d′(p)
def
= d†(p) ∩A and out′(p)
def
= out(max(p)). 
We should check that the deﬁnition of trace does indeed yield a span. In order
to show that out′ is rigid we observe the following.
Lemma 4.8 For e1 and e2 in x ∈ C(E), if e1≺xe2 and e1 ≤ e2 then out(e1) ∈ C.
Proof. By a simple induction on the length of chain e1 ≺x · · · ≺x e2.
Basis: Suppose that e1 ≺x e2. In this case e1 ≤ e2 implies that e1 →x e2, so
out(e1) ∈ C.
Induction step: Suppose that the property holds for all chains of length less than
or equal to k, i.e., assume that if e1≺x
ke2 and e1 ≤ e2 then out(e1) ∈ C. Suppose
e1≺x
k+1e2 and e1 ≤ e2. Then there exists an e
′ with e1≺x
ke′ and e′ ≺x e2. If e1 ≤ e
′
then, by the induction hypothesis, out(e1) ∈ C. If e1 ≤ e
′ then, as e1 ≤ e2, we have
e′ ≤ e2 and so out(e
′) ∈ C. But then out(e1) ∈ C as out is a rigid morphism. 
Lemma 4.9 The map out′ is a rigid morphism:
Proof. We ﬁrst show that out′ preserves causal dependency. Suppose p′ ≤ p in
P . Write max(p′) = e′ and max(p) = e. Then, e′ ≺p e as [e]p = {e}p. Now, by
Lemma 4.8, e′ ≤ e as out(e′) ∈ B. Thus out(e′) ≤ out(e), as out is rigid, which
directly yields out′(p′) ≤ out′(p).
Now let X be a conﬁguration of P . First observe that
out′X = B ∩ out
⋃
X .
Clearly we have the inclusion out′ X ⊆ B∩ out
⋃
X. To show the reverse inclusion,
suppose e ∈
⋃
X and out(e) ∈ B. Then, e ∈ p for some p ∈ X. Write p′
def
= [e]p.
Because p′ ≤ p and X is downwards closed, p′ ∈ X, with out′(p′) = out(e)—as
required.
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It follows from the observation that out′X is a conﬁguration of B: because X is
a set of pairwise compatible conﬁgurations of E so is their union
⋃
X, and therefore
so is the image under the morphism out and ‘projection’ to B.
Suppose p, p′ ∈ X and out′(p) = out′(p′). The union
⋃
X is a secure conﬁgu-
ration, compatible with both p and p′. Thus p = [e]SX and p
′ = [e′]SX for some
e, e′ ∈
⋃
X. From the deﬁnition of out′ it follows that out(e) = out(e′). Because
out is a rigid morphism sending both e, e′ ∈
⋃
X to common event we must have
e = e′. Hence p = p′. 
Theorem 4.10 The trace Tr(A⊗ C
d
← E
out
→ B ⊗ C) is a span.
Proof. In the deﬁnition of the trace Tr(E) as the span A
d′
← P
out′
→ B it is easily
seen that P is an event structure. Lemma 4.9 conﬁrms that out′ is indeed a rigid
morphism. That d′ is a demand morphism follows directly from its deﬁnition. 
Relying on previous work [4,5], we can show that the operation Tr obeys the
trace axioms up to isomorphism—see Appendix. In [4,5], a trace operation was given
for stable port profunctors. Spans of event structures represent such profunctors.
The representation respects both sequential and parallel composition as well as the
trace operation.
5 Deterministic Dataﬂow
To connect with Kahn’s classic treatment of deterministic dataﬂow we deﬁne the
notion of a deterministic span. Such spans represent stable functions between do-
mains of conﬁgurations, and can be used to model deterministic dataﬂow. The
trace construction on event structures is shown to correspond to the least ﬁxed
point construction detailed in [6].
Deﬁnition 5.1 A span
E
d


 out



A B
is deterministic iﬀ d(e1) ↑ d(e2)⇒ ¬(e1#e2). 
The extra requirement of the demand morphism ensures that no two conﬂicting
events of E can require consistent conﬁgurations of A. Such spans represent stable
functions [1] between domains of conﬁgurations.
Deﬁnition 5.2 Let A
d
← E
out
→ B be a deterministic span. Deﬁne
∼
E: C(A) → C(B)
by
∼
E (y)
def
= out{e ∈ E | d(e) ⊆ y} , for all y ∈ C(A).

Theorem 5.3 The function
∼
E: C(A) → C(B) is continuous, and stable, for all
deterministic spans E. Moreover, any stable function from C(A) to C(B) can be
represented in this way.
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Proof. As the demand of an event is a ﬁnite conﬁguration it follows straightfor-
wardly that
∼
E is continuous. To see it is stable we observe that
∼
E factors into the
composition out ◦ F where
F (y) = {e ∈ E | d(e) ⊆ y} , for y ∈ C(A) .
The function F : C(A) → C(E) preserves all intersections, so certainly stable, while
out is a rigid morphism so a stable function on conﬁgurations, from C(E) to C(B).
Their composition
∼
E is therefore stable.
To see that any stable function f : C(A) → C(B) can be represented by a
deterministic span, deﬁne a corresponding event structure E as follows. Its events
E are pairs (y, b) where y is a ﬁnite conﬁguration of A and b is an event of B for
which y a minimal conﬁguration such that b ∈ f(y)—in other words b ∈ f(y) and
for no conﬁguration y′ ⊂ y do we have b ∈ f(y′). (Because f is stable, if b ∈ f(w)
then there is a unique, minimum y ⊆ w with (y, b) ∈ E.) Deﬁne
(y, b) ≤ (y′, b′) iﬀ y ⊆ y′ & b ≤ b′ , and
(y, b)#(y′, b′) iﬀ y ↑ y′ or b#b′ .
Deﬁne d(y, b) = y and out(y, b) = b. It is routine to check that this deﬁnes an event
structure E, a demand morphism d : E → A and rigid morphism out : E → B,
which together form a deterministic span such that
∼
E= f . 
Theorem 5.3 and its proof provide two operations, one from deterministic spans
to stable functions, and an inverse operation from stable functions to deterministic
spans. These operations are part of an equivalence between the bicategory of de-
terministic spans and the order-enriched category of stable functions on coherent
prime algebraic domains.
Proposition 5.4 The composition of two deterministic spans is deterministic.
Proof. Let A
d1← E1
out1→ B and B
d2← E2
out2→ C be deterministic spans with compo-
sition A
d
← E3
out
→ C, which we check is deterministic.
Let (x1, e2) and (x
′
1, e
′
2) be events in E3 and assume d(x1, e2) ↑ d(x
′
1, e
′
2). This
is true iﬀ d1
†(x1) ↑ d1
†(x′1). As the span E1 is deterministic, x1 ↑ x
′
1. Consequently,
d2(e2) ↑ d2(e
′
2), because by the deﬁnition of composition d2(e2) = out1 x1 and
d2(e
′
2) = out1 x
′
1 and out1 preserves compatibility. This implies that ¬(e2#e
′
2),
as the span E2 is deterministic. As x1 ↑ x
′
1 and ¬(e2#e
′
2) it follows that
¬((x1, e2)#(x
′
1, e
′
2)). 
For the remainder of this section, let
A⊗C
d
← E
out
→ B ⊗ C
be a deterministic span. We explore the properties of its trace. For notational sim-
plicity we assume that A∩C = ∅ and B∩C = ∅ and take the parallel compositions
A⊗ C and B ⊗ C to be unions.
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Lemma 5.5 Let y ∈ C(A). For s ⊆ E deﬁne
ϕ(s) = {e ∈ E | d(e) ⊆ y ∪ (C ∩ out s)} .
This determines a continuous function ϕ : C(E) → C(E) such that Sec(y)
def
=
μs.ϕ(s), the least ﬁxed point of ϕ, is a secure conﬁguration of E.
Moreover, Sec(y) is the maximum secure conﬁguration x of E such that
d†(x) ∩A ⊆ y .
Proof. That ϕ is a function between conﬁgurations follows from determinism, while
continuity follows from ﬁniteness of demands, as in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Then μs.ϕ(s) =
⋃
i∈ω si, a union of an ⊆-increasing chain of conﬁgurations of E
given inductively by
s0 = ∅
si+1 =ϕ(si).
Observe that, as ϕ is a function from conﬁguration to conﬁguration, si ∈ C(E) for
all i ∈ ω.
We show by induction that si secure for all i ∈ ω.
Base case: The property trivially holds for s0.
Inductive step: Assume that sk is secure. Each event in sk is secured and therefore
has a securing sequence within sk. Any additional events e in sk+1 have d(e)∩C ⊆
out sk. We can therefore give a securing sequence for e by combining the securing
sequences of the events upon which it depends according to ≺sk+1. Therefore sk+1 is
secure. This shows that Sec(y) is secure for all y ∈ C and it is clear that d†(Sec(y))∩
A ⊆ y.
Suppose x ∈ C(E) is secure and d†(x) ∩ A ⊆ y. By Corollary 4.4, ≺x is well-
founded. We show by well-founded induction on ≺x that
∀e ∈ x. e ∈ Sec(y) .
Suppose e′ ∈ Sec(y) for all e′ ≺x e. Then d(e) ∩ C ⊆ out Sec(y) as x is secure and
by assumption d(e) ∩ A ⊆ y ; because x is secure d(e) ∩ C ⊆ out x (Corollary 4.4)
and if out(e′) ∈ d(e) ∩ C then e′ →x e, so e
′ ∈ Sec(y) inductively. Hence d(e) ⊆
y ∪ (C ∩ out Sec(y)) and therefore e ∈ ϕ(Sec(y)) = Sec(y). 
Corollary 5.6 The trace Tr(E), of the (arbitrary) deterministic span E, is deter-
ministic.
Proof. Suppose p1, p2 ∈ Tr(E) have compatible demands d
′(p1) and d
′(p2), i.e.,
there is a conﬁguration y of A such that
d†(p1) ∩A ⊆ y and d
†(p2) ∩A ⊆ y .
But Sec(y) is the maximum secure conﬁguration x of E such that
d†(x) ∩A ⊆ y
L. Saunders-Evans, G. Winskel / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 175 (2007) 109–129 121
—Lemma 5.5. Both p1 and p2 are secure conﬁgurations. Hence both p1 ⊆ Sec(y)
and p2 ⊆ Sec(y), so p1 and p2 are compatible as secure conﬁgurations, and hence
not in conﬂict as events of the trace. 
Lemma 5.7 For all y ∈ C(A),
∼
Tr(E) (y) = B ∩ (out Sec(y)) .
Proof. By deﬁnition
∼
Tr(E) (y) = out′{p ∈ Tr(E) | d†(p) ∩A ⊆ y} ,
where out′(p) = out(max(p)) ∈ B for p ∈ Tr(E). If d†(p) ∩ A ⊆ y with p ∈ Tr(E)
then p is secure, so p ⊆ Sec(y) by the maximum property of Sec(y)—Lemma 5.5.
It follows that
∼
Tr(E) (y) ⊆ B∩ (out Sec(y)). To see the reverse inclusion, note that
for any e ∈ Sec(y) with out(e) ∈ B we have [e]Sec(y) ∈ Tr(E). 
In conclusion we can understand the trace of the deterministic span in terms
of the least ﬁxed point of its associated function; the trace of deterministic event
structures reduces to the trace known to Kahn [6].
Theorem 5.8 For all w ∈ C(A),
∼
Tr(E) (w) = B ∩ μz ∈ C(B ⊗ C).
∼
E (w ∪ (C ∩ out z)) .
Proof. By Lemma 5.7,
∼
Tr(E) (w) = B ∩ out(μx.ϕ(x))
where ϕ : C(E) → C(E) is the continuous function given by
ϕ(x) = {e ∈ E | d(e) ⊆ w ∪ (C ∩ out x)}
for x ∈ C(E).
Deﬁne the continuous function ψ : C(B ⊗ C)→ C(B ⊗ C) by taking
ψ(u) =
∼
E (w ∪ (C ∩ u))
for u ∈ C(B ⊗ C).
It is easy to see that out : C(E) → C(B⊗C) induces a strict continuous function
between the domains of conﬁgurations. Directly from their deﬁnition we see that
out ϕ(x) = ψ(out x)
for x ∈ C(E); both expressions equal
out{e ∈ E | d(e) ⊆ w ∪ (C ∩ out x)} .
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By a well-known property of least ﬁxed points we now know that μu.ψ(u) =
out(μx.ϕ(x)), which gives the result directly. 
6 Concluding Remarks
Spans of event structures provide an intuitive semantics for both deterministic and
nondeterministic dataﬂow. The semantics provides a good example of the way in
which event structures can be used to represent both types and processes acting
between types.
The spans of event structures used here were ﬁrst discovered in joint work with
Mikkel Nygaard [9]. There they provided an informative, more operational repre-
sentation of the profunctors which appeared as denotations of aﬃne-HOPLA—an
aﬃne language for higher-order processes. (There is a function space construction
for spans to accompany the parallel composition ⊗.) It was realised later that the
same spans also represented the profunctors used in an earlier ‘relational’ model of
nondeterministic dataﬂow [4,5].
Such spans are part of a much more general picture, the beginnings of which are
sketched in [14,12]. But we hope that our treatment of nondeterministic dataﬂow
can stand alone, and in itself make a convincing case for the usefulness of spans of
event structures.
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A Appendix: spans and rooted profunctors
We show how spans of event structures correspond to certain profunctors and that
the trace we have deﬁned on spans coincides with the trace deﬁned on stable pro-
functors in [4,5]. The profunctors are between partial orders of ﬁnite conﬁgurations
(regarded as categories). We shall write Co(E) for the partial order of ﬁnite conﬁg-
urations of an event structure E under inclusion.
In describing the profunctor determined by a span it is helpful to have a further
characterisation of rigid morphisms between event structures:
Proposition A.1 Let E1 and E2 be event structures. A function f from the set of
events E1 to the set of events E2 is a rigid morphism f : E1 → E2 iﬀ it
∀x ∈ C(E1). fx ∈ C(E2) & ∀e, e
′ ∈ x. f(e) = f(e′)⇒ e = e′ , and
∀x′ ∈ C(E1), y ∈ C(E2). y ⊆ fx
′ ⇒ ∃x ∈ C(E1). x ⊆ x
′ & fx = y .
(x is necessarily unique and given by x = {e ∈ x′ | out(e) ∈ y}.)
Consider a span A
d
← E
out
→ B between a event structures A and B. Let y be a
ﬁnite conﬁguration of A and z a ﬁnite conﬁguration of B—so y is some particular
ﬁnite input and z some particular ﬁnite output. Deﬁne the set
E(y, z) = {x ∈ Co(E) | d†(x) ⊆ y & out x = z} .
The set E(y, z) consists of all the conﬁgurations of E, necessarily ﬁnite, which
for input y yield output z. The set E(y, z) is functorial in y ∈ Co(A) and z ∈
Co(B)op; it respects the inclusion order on conﬁgurations covariantly for input and
contravariantly for output. Suppose y ⊆ y′ in Co(A). Then, E(y, z) ⊆ E(y′, z) —
simply because any conﬁguration x of E with demand d†(x) ⊆ y will make d†(x) ⊆
y′. So, an inclusion i : y ⊆ y′ in Co(A) determines an inclusion map
E(i, z) : E(y, z) ↪→ E(y′, z) .
An inclusion j : z ⊆ z′ in Co(B) determines a map
E(y, j) : E(y, z′)→ E(y, z) .
It takes x′, for which out x′ = z′, to the unique sub-conﬁguration x ⊆ x′ of E
for which out x = z; this exists because out is a rigid map of event structures—
Proposition A.1. It is easy to see that these associations of maps with inclusions
respect identities and composition, so we have a functor to the category of sets
E : Co(A)× Co(B)op → Set ,
i.e., a profunctor from Co(A) to Co(B).
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By the properties of rigid maps it is easy to see that E(y, ∅) = {∅}, so a singleton,
for any y ∈ Co(A)—the profunctor is rooted . Via ‘currying’ the profunctor corre-
sponds to a functor from Co(A) to the functor category [Co(B)op,Set] of presheaves
over Co(B). It can be shown that the functor so obtained preserves pullbacks.
Consequently, the profunctor E is stable in the sense of [4,5]. It follows that the
composition of spans is sent to the composition of (stable) profunctors. In addition,
a morphism between two spans A
d
← E
out
→ B and A
d′
← E′
out′
→ B is a rigid morphism
of event structures f : E → E′ such that the two triangles commute in
E
f

d
		






out



		
		
		
		
		
		
		
E′
d′











out′





A B
—recall we regard rigid morphisms and demand morphisms as maps on conﬁgu-
rations in making sense of their composition. Such a morphism of spans induce
cartesian natural transformations between the associated functors from Co(A) to
the functor category [Co(B)op,Set].
The paper [4,5] studies a trace construction on rooted profunctors for nondeter-
ministic dataﬂow. In loc. cit. the tensor operation is also given by simple parallel
composition. We now sketch why the trace construction there coincides with that
on event structures, that
Tr(E) ∼= Tr(E)
for any span A⊗ C
d
← E
out
→ B ⊗ C. In particular, we inherit the properties of the
trace proved in the earlier work.
The deﬁnition of trace on stable profunctors (Deﬁnition 18 in [4]) is based on
the usual coend operation on profunctors (see e.g., [3]) but restricted to elements
which are secure—where an element being secure is expressed without the beneﬁt
of concepts from event structures. We can as well give the deﬁnitions with respect
to E for a particular span of event structures A⊗ C
d
← E
out
→ B ⊗ C, assumed from
now on. As usual, we will assume that the event structures A and C, and the event
structures are disjoint so that the parallel compositions A⊗C and B⊗C are given
by unions. By deﬁnition, an element of the profunctor E consists of a triple (y, z;x)
where x ∈ E(y, z). Elements of E can be thought of as states in the computation
between A and B. The deﬁnition of trace on stable profunctors hinges on three
basic relations between elements of the profunctor.
Deﬁnition A.2 Let (y, z;x) and (y′, z′;x′) be elements of E. Deﬁne
(y, z;x)
A
→ (y′, z′;x′) iﬀ z = z′ & x = x′ & ∃a ∈ A. y ∪ {a} = y′ , and
(y, z;x)
B
→ (y′, z′;x′) iﬀ y = y′ & ∃b ∈ B. z ∪ {b} = z′ & x = {e ∈ x′ | out(e) ∈ z} .
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Deﬁne (y, z;x) (y′, z′;x′) iﬀ (y, z′;x′) is an element with
y ⊆ y′ & z ⊆ z′ &
y ∩A = y′ ∩A & z ∩B = z′ ∩B &
y ∩ C = z ∩ C & y′ ∩ C = z′ ∩ C &
x = {e ∈ x′ | out(e) ∈ z} .

The relation
A
→ concerns the change of element associated with input in A, the
relation
A
→ with output in B. The relation  concerns input in C which is matched
by prior output on C and plays a key role in those elements allowed in the deﬁnition
of trace of a stable profunctor.
We use the following fact several times.
Proposition A.3 A ﬁnite conﬁguration of E is secure iﬀ there is a securing se-
quence e1, · · · , en such that x = {e1, · · · , en}.
Proof. If : Directly from the deﬁnition of securing sequence. Only if : Assuming
that x is a secure conﬁguration, the relation ≺x is well-founded and d
†(x) ∩ C ⊆
out x. When x is ﬁnite we can order its events, say as e1, · · · , en, in a way that
respects ≺x, i.e. so ei ≺x ej implies i < j. This yields a securing sequence such
that x = {e1, · · · , en}. 
The notion of secure element of a stable profunctor derived from these relations
(and used in [4,5]) corresponds to that of secure conﬁguration:
Lemma A.4 Let (y, z;x) be an element of E. Then, (∅, ∅; ∅)(
A
→ ∪
B
→ ∪)(y, z;x)
(i.e., the element is secure [4,5]) iﬀ the conﬁguration x is secure.
Proof. Only if : Consider the following property of an element (y, z;x) of E:
Q(y, z;x) iﬀ x is secure and y ∩ C ⊆ out x .
Clearly Q(∅, ∅; ∅). It suﬃces to show in the cases (i) (y, z;x)
A
→ (y′, z′;x′),
(ii) (y, z;x)
B
→ (y′, z′;x′) or (iii) (y, z;x)  (y′, z′;x′), that if Q(y, z;x) then
Q(y′, z′;x′).
(i) If (y, z;x)
A
→ (y′, z′;x′), then x′ = x and y′ ∩ C = y ∩ C. So clearly Q(y, z;x)
implies Q(y′, z′;x′).
(ii) Suppose (y, z;x)
B
→ (y′, z′;x′) and that x is secure and y∩C ⊆ out x. Then y′ =
y and x′ = x∪ {e′} for some e′ /∈ x with out(e′) ∈ B. Because x is ﬁnite and secure
we can construct a securing sequence e1, · · · , en such that x = {e1, · · · , en}. The
extended sequence e1, · · · , en, e
′ is also a securing sequence; the extra requirement
that d(e′) ∩ C ⊆ out {e1, · · · , en} follows by
d(e′) ∩ C ⊆ d†(x′) ∩C ⊆ y′ ∩ C = y ∩ C ⊆ out x .
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Hence x′ is secure, and clearly y′ ∩ C ⊆ out x′.
(iii) Suppose (y, z;x) (y′, z′;x′) and that x is secure and y∩C ⊆ out x. As in (ii),
take a securing sequence e1, · · · , en such that x = {e1, · · · , en}. Because x ⊆ x
′, with
x′ a ﬁnite conﬁguration, we can choose a sequence of events e′1, · · · , e
′
m such that
x∪ {e′1, · · · , e
′
i} is a conﬁguration of E for all 0 < i ≤ m with x
′ = x∪ {e′1, · · · , e
′
m}.
We claim that the concatenated sequence
e1, · · · , en, e
′
1, · · · , e
′
m
is a securing sequence: from the deﬁnition of it follows that d†(x′) ⊆ y, and hence
that
d(e′i) ∩ C ⊆ y ∩C ⊆ out x ⊆ {e1, · · · , en, e
′
1, · · · , e
′
i−1} ,
the extra condition required to be securing. Thus x′ is secure. From the deﬁnition
of , we have y′ ∩C = z′ ∩C, and z′ ∩C = (out x′)∩C as (y′, z′;x′) is an element
of E. So certainly y′ ∩ C ⊆ out x′.
If : Write x
e
→ x′ iﬀ x and x′ are secure conﬁgurations of E such that e /∈ x and
x′ = x ∪ {e}.
We ﬁrst show: if x
e
→ x′ and (y, z;x) is an element of E with z ∩ C ⊆ y, then
(y, z;x)(
A
→ ∪
B
→ ∪)(y′, z′;x′) for some element (y′, z′;x′) with z′ ∩ C ⊆ y′.
Assume x
e
→ x′ and (y, z;x) is an element with z ∩ C ⊆ y. First note that as
x′ is secure, d(e) ∩ C ⊆ out x; for a securing sequence e1, · · · , en = e for e in x
′ we
must have d(e) ∩ C ⊆ {e1, · · · , en−1} ⊆ x. There are two cases, when out(e) ∈ B
and out(e) ∈ C.
Suppose out(e) ∈ B. Then
(y, z;x)
A
→
∗
(y ∪ d(e), z;x)
B
→ (y ∪ d(e), z ∪ {out(e)};x′) ,
where we have made use of the fact that d(e) \ y ⊆ A. This follows because
d(e) ∩ C ⊆ (out x) ∩ C = z ∩ C ⊆ y .
Also,
(z ∪ {out(e)}) ∩ C = z ∩ C ⊆ y ⊆ y ∪ d(e) .
Suppose out(e) ∈ C. Then
(y, z;x)
A
→
∗
(y ∪ d(e), z;x)  (y ∪ d(e) ∪ {out(e)}, z ∪ {out(e)};x′) .
Again we have used the fact that d(e) \ y ⊆ A. Also,
(z ∪ {out(e)}) ∩ C = (z ∩C) ∪ {out(e)} ⊆ y ∪ d(e) ∪ {out(e)} .
Now, assume x is a ﬁnite, secure conﬁguration of E. We can choose a securing
sequence e1, · · · , en such that {e1, · · · , en} = x. Write xi = {e1, · · · , ei}, where
0 ≤ i ≤ n. Then each xi is secure and
∅ = x0
e1→ x1
e2→ · · ·
en→ xn = x .
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By the above we can inductively, left-to-right, produce a chain
(∅, ∅; ∅)(
A
→ ∪
B
→ ∪)(y, z;x)
to an element (y, z;x) of E. 
Now we deﬁne the trace of the stable profunctor E from [4,5]. For those familiar
with coends, the deﬁnition mimics the construction of a coend in the category of
sets, but in this case restricted to secured elements. It rests on an equivalence rela-
tion ∼ between secured elements (the relation coincides with the usual equivalence
associated with the coend in sets).
Deﬁnition A.5 The relation ∼, between secure elements of E, is deﬁned to be the
symmetric, transitive closure of .
Following [4,5], the trace of E is deﬁned to be the (stable) profunctor
Tr(E) : Co(A)× Co(B)op → Set ,
given as follows. For y0 ∈ C
o(A) and z0 ∈ C
o(B),
Tr(E)(y0, z0) = {{y, z;x}∼ | (y, z;x) is a secure element & y ∩A = y0 & z ∩B = z0} .
An inclusion i : y0 ⊆ y
′
0 in C
o(A) determines a map
Tr(E)(i, z0) : Tr(E)(y0, z0) → Tr(E)(y
′
0, z0) ,
which takes {y, z;x}∼ to {y ∪ y
′
0, z;x}∼. An inclusion j : z0 ⊆ z
′
0 in C
o(B) deter-
mines a map
Tr(E)(y0, j) : Tr(E)(y0, z
′
0) → Tr(E)(y0, z0) ;
it takes {y′, z′;x′}∼ to {y
′, z′ ∩ z0; {e ∈ x
′ | out(e) ∈ z′ ∩ z0}}∼. (It follows from the
functoriality of E that the functions Tr(E)(i, z0) and Tr(E)(y0, j) are well-deﬁned,
as does the functoriality of Tr(E).) 
Deﬁnition A.6 Let x be a secure conﬁguration of E. Deﬁne
min(x)
def
=
⋂
{s ⊆ x | s ∈ C(E) & s secure & out(s) ∩B = out(x) ∩B} .
(Because the secure conﬁguration of E form a stable family, min(x) is the minimum
secure sub-conﬁguration of x that outputs the same B events as x.) 
Lemma A.7 For secure elements, (y, z;x) ∼ (y′, z′;x′) iﬀ
y ∩A = y′ ∩A & z ∩B = z′ ∩B & min(x) = min(x′) .
Proof. If : Assume y∩A = y′∩A and z∩B = z′∩B and min(x) = min(x′). Deﬁne
x0 = min(x), y0 = d
†(x0)∪(y∩A) and z0 = out x0. Then (y0, z0;x0) (y, z;x) from
the deﬁnition of . Similarly, (y0, z0;x0) (y
′, z′;x′). Hence (y, z;x) ∼ (y′, z′;x′).
Only if : Assume (y, z;x)  (y′, z′;x′). Then, y ∩ A = y′ ∩ A and z ∩ B = z′ ∩ B
directly from the deﬁnition of . Clearly, x ⊆ x′. From its deﬁnition, min(x) is
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the least, secure conﬁguration s ⊆ x such that (out s)∩B = z ∩B. Hence it is also
the least, secure conﬁguration s ⊆ x′ such that (out s) ∩ B = z′ ∩ B, so equal to
min(x′). 
Theorem A.8 There is a natural isomorphism
θ : Tr(E) ∼= Tr(E)
with components θy0,z0 : Tr(E)(y0, z0) → Tr(E)(y0, z0), for y0 ∈ C
o(A) and z0 ∈
Co(B), given by θy0,z0({y, z;x}∼) = {p ∈ Tr(E) | p ⊆ x}.
Proof. Observe that for a secure conﬁguration x of E that
min(x) =
⋃
{p ∈ Tr(E) | p ⊆ x} .
In particular, θy0,z0 is a well-deﬁned function because θy0,z0({y, z;x}∼) consists of
those p ∈ Tr(E) for which p ⊆ min(x). Tentatively, deﬁne an inverse to θy0,z0,
ϕy0,z0 : Tr(E)(y0, z0) → Tr(E)(y0, z0)
by taking ϕy0,z0(X) = {y, z;x}∼ where x =
⋃
X, y = d†(x) ∪ y0 and z = out x.
Then,
ϕy0,z0θy0,z0({y, z;x}∼) = ϕy0,z0({p ∈ Tr(E) | p ⊆ x})
= {d†(min(x)) ∪ y0, outmin(x);min(x)}∼ = {y, z;x}∼ ,
by the observation, and
θy0,z0ϕy0,z0(X) = {p ∈ Tr(E) | p ⊆
⋃
X} = X ,
from the properties of primes as X is downwards closed. We omit the fairly routine
veriﬁcation of naturality. 
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